Kinks in the Armor...
Well, it appears that even the Bush Administration didn't (and still doesn't) completely agree on whether the "surge" would quell the violence in Iraq:
There are other questions to consider as well, like: Why is our military preforming police functions without constant input from American police officials? People like ex-DC Chief Ramsey should have been there from the beginning. For the Bush Administration, how many American troops constitute an occupation in the eyes of the Iraqi people? Those against invading Iraq believe we've past that point. When will political success become more important than military success? To date, Bush believes every victory must be military in nature in order for the political side to succeed, but dissenters believe that political advancement can help some factions "drop their guns."
And (just for my edification) why are some acts of violence in Iraq classified as "Sectarian violence" while others treated as "murder?"
For Bush, the eight months since announcing his "new way forward" in Iraq have been about not just organizing a major force deployment but also managing a remarkable conflict within his administration, mounting a rear-guard action against Congress and navigating a dysfunctional relationship with an Iraqi leadership that has proved incapable of delivering what he needs.
Although the administration has presented a united front, senior officials remain split over whether Bush's strategy will work in the long term. Bush gambled that a "surge" of 30,000 troops in the streets of Baghdad and the western province of Anbar would establish enough security to give "breathing space" to Iraq's sectarian leaders to find common ground.
But as Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker deliver progress reports to Congress tomorrow, the questions they are likely to face are the same ones asked internally: How long should the troop buildup last? When should U.S. forces start to come home? Should the United States stand by Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki or seek another leader? What are the hidden risks of the emerging alliance with Sunni tribal leaders? What is the best outcome Washington can hope for at this point?
There are other questions to consider as well, like: Why is our military preforming police functions without constant input from American police officials? People like ex-DC Chief Ramsey should have been there from the beginning. For the Bush Administration, how many American troops constitute an occupation in the eyes of the Iraqi people? Those against invading Iraq believe we've past that point. When will political success become more important than military success? To date, Bush believes every victory must be military in nature in order for the political side to succeed, but dissenters believe that political advancement can help some factions "drop their guns."
And (just for my edification) why are some acts of violence in Iraq classified as "Sectarian violence" while others treated as "murder?"
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