Is Nuclear War Still A Deterrent?

Growing up, I was led to believe that the one thing stopping the entire planet from suffering a nuclear winter was that those in charge (aka the world leaders) cared too much about themselves or those close to them to ever put us all in that situation.

Now (especially in light of what's happened over the last few months), I am not too sure.

Back in January 2023, the US Navy Commander David Post for the US Naval Institute attempted to address the "value and limits" of deterrence. First he sought out a definition:

Two leading deterrence scholars, Alex George and Richard Smoke, define deterrence as “simply the persuasion of one’s opponent that the costs and/or risks of a given course of action he might take outweigh its benefits.” Deterrence, therefore, hinges on a rational process of calculating costs and benefits and will succeed when the opponent concludes that the considered activity will not be worth the effort.

Honestly, I like this definition, even though it implies that most, if not every country, who has nuclear weapons are by default enemies of the United States. Then came a curveball: 

But what makes deterrence work? There is no consensus, but I suggest that deterrence is based on five unchanging principles.

Post fleshes his principles out in the article, but here they are:

1. First, nuclear deterrence partially hinges on the principle that the adversaries are (and perceive themselves to be) vulnerable to a punishment threatened if an adversary crosses specified red lines or menaces the vital interests of the state. 
2. Second is the principle of uncertainty. Nuclear deterrence requires that, though the adversary knows of the existence and scale of the nuclear state’s weapons, it cannot know the exact extent or location of capabilities or when they might be employed. 
3. Third, nuclear deterrence partially hinges on the exceptional nature of nuclear weapons.
4. Fourth, nuclear deterrence hinges on the adversary being a rational actor. In its simplest sense, rationality requires that actors can identify their preferences and can judge for themselves the best way to achieve their goals.
5. Last, nuclear deterrence requires the communication of credible deterrence threats. Adversaries must know that if they threaten U.S. interests, the U.S. will be willing and able to deny benefits and impose unacceptable costs. 

I would argue that depending on the administration, the United States has been guilty of violating between one and three of these principles since the end of WWII. But of course, this article is about those who aren't the US or her allies (which is part of the problem; deterrence should be a global concept):

The United States must develop a nuclear posture that acknowledges the risk of nuclear war while being vigilant not to encourage nuclear proliferation. There is no nuclear posture the country can adopt that will convince other states to abandon their nuclear weapons.

 

So what does Post recommend? Well, again in a recap:

1. First, the nuclear declaratory posture should focus on communicating U.S. capability and will to respond when vital interests are threatened. The bar for nuclear use should be high, but the promise if that bar is reached should be a definite and punishing response.
2. Second, the U.S. nuclear posture should continue to be flexible. U.S. nuclear forces should be designed in such a way that any feasible target within an adversary nuclear state may be threatened at any time, and adversaries must know that this is the case. 
3. Third, with the demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the United States should consider fielding a numerically modest mobile, land-based, intermediate or medium-range nuclear system. 
4. Fourth, U.S. nuclear posture should be expressly against, both in declaratory and operational terms, the consideration of nuclear weapons as warfighting tools, or even worse, as de-escalatory devices.
5. Finally, focusing nuclear deterrence on the high end of the continuum of conflict should encourage investment in other methods of deterrence at the lower end.

I can't help but think there's some contradiction here. If there is a "high bar" that doesn't include "warfighting," then what actions would call for a nuclear response? Is the vague definition of "threat to national security" enough to warrant launching nuclear weapons? 

In some circles, the answer, sadly, is "Yes." In August of 2023, when the Atlantic Council wrote of the United States needing to be prepared to fight China and North Korea simultaneously. One of the core conceits in this article is that China and/or North Korea would be the aggressor (with China making a move against Taiwan and North Korea engaging with South Korea), with little or no provocation from the United States. It should be noted that between being an economic or military threat, it's the former that China currently represents (China has not be involved in a war since 1979, and the scope of their military bases pales in comparison to the United States). Also, at the moment, China has better relations with South Korea than North Korea. 

Not to be outdone, The Heritage Foundation had it's own take on nuclear deterrence when comparing it to nuclear warfighting; it can be summed up as, "Russia and China are the bad guys, and their nuclear technology and approach to using is is far more modernized than the US, so America better wake up and get with the times." In their defense, the United States nuclear systems is still in the floppy disk phase in a lot of areas. 

Keeping that in mind, here's of how the America mainstream media has tackled the issue of nuclear escalation: Newsweek designed a map back in December 2024 that "shows the safest states to live in during a simulated nuclear attack on U.S. silo fields" while acknowledging that "safe" is a relative term. And by relative, I mean that there was also a story from the Irish Star predicting that 75% of the US would be wiped out. 

And this is just the reaction to countries America believes are targeting them; what about potential nuclear conflicts that don't directly involve the United States? Case in point: earlier in the year Indian PM Narendra Modi has stated that "nuclear blackmail" (i.e., having nuclear weapons) will not protect rival nation Pakistan. Neither of these countries are on America's radar as "threats to national security" (mostly because their governments are not the most stable and their influence on the world stage is minimal), but nevertheless, their conflict could potentially lead to a nuclear war. Where's the contingency plans for these types of nations?  

This glaring blind spot highlights the biggest issue I see with how the United States addresses the issue of nuclear deterrence; a hesitation to give an elaborate and concrete answer to the following question: "What exactly makes another country a threat to the United States?" 

As it is, I think that what's going to save us from experiencing nuclear war is an act of God or a global social revolution (and depending on what you subscribe to, the two options may not be that different).